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IMPRISONMENT UNDER THE ILLINOIS UNIFIED CODE
OF CORRECTIONS: DUE PROCESS, FLEXIBILITY,
AND SOME FUTURE DOUBTS
PATRICK D. MCANANY*
WHEN THE GENERAL Assembly passed the Unified Code of Correc-
tions into law in its 1972 legislative session,' it provided the State of
Illinois with the first comprehensive overhaul of its post-adjudicative
processes in history. Prior to this, Illinois had had many piecemeal
changes, some quite extensive, in matters relating to sentencing and
incarceration, but none had attempted to approach these matters as
a whole and view them in a systematic manner. Indeed, even at this
point in our jurisprudential development as a nation, there has been
little systematic study of these areas. 2  Building on what had been done
elsewhere and what Illinois experience had been at home, the Code
forges a new and more complete rationale for the processes of our
sanctioning system.'
If there were few guidelines for the general post-adjudicatory sys-
tem, there were even fewer for the vexed area of imprisonment and its
consequences. Since incarceration has become the norm for sanctioning
* A.B. 1951 Rockhurst; M.A. 1958 St. Louis; LL.B. 1960 Harvard; Associate
Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Illinois Chicago Circle. Prof. McAnany
served as Project Director and Reporter for the Unified Code of Corrections.
1. Pub. Act 77-2097, Approved July 26, 1972. The Code, as passed, contained
two major sections: Chapter III, dealing with the Department of Corrections and
Chapter V dealing with sentencing. Chapter VI, dealing with the organization of
probation services, was deleted from the Code prior to passage. Changes in the
Juvenile Court Act which were introduced together with the Code deal with disposi-
tional matters. See Pub. Act 77-2096, Approved July 26, 1972. Treatment of juveniles
committed to the Juvenile Division of the Department of Corrections is dealt with in
Chapter III of the Code.
2. The most comprehensive approach to date has been made in the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code (P.O.D. 1962) which included in its structure all
the basic areas which the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38,
§§ 1001-1008 (1971) (hereinafter referred to as IUCC), dealt with. Clearly, however,
the substantial effort of the Institute was devoted to areas of substantive criminal law
rather than corrections. Other partial efforts are contained in the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice and the various model
acts produced by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, e.g., Model Sen-
tencing Act (1963), California's Committee on Penal Reform has recently produced a
comprehensive criminal code proposal.
3. For a brief overview of the whole Code, see Pusateri and Scott, Illinois' New
Unified Code of Corrections, 61111. B.J. 62 (1972).
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criminal offenses in the United States,4 its treatment in any code of
corrections is central. The problems with its use, however, raise most
serious questions of freedom, discretion and due process. This article
will attempt to draw together and comment on those sections of the
Code dealing with the issue of imprisonment5 and its consequences for
those on whom it is imposed.
I. DISCRETION AND DUE PROCESS: CONFLICT IN
A CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM
Chapter Three of the Unified Code of Corrections6 is devoted to
the Department of Corrections and its task of "care, custody, treatment
and rehabilitation,' 7 of committed persons." It is based upon scattered
sections and chapters of former Illinois law9 and attempts to create a
consolidated and unified approach to what had been legislation by
accretion. Its purpose is to spell out an administrative structure for the
execution of the sanction of imprisonment. Imprisonment in Illinois,
as elsewhere, has left the administrator more or less free to exercise his
discretion over the inmate.' 0 Thus the committed person lives by rules
that are created, enforced, and changed entirely by administrators. This
situation in a closed institution of hostile and sometime violent persons
can generate rules and decisions of the most arbitrary and abrupt kinds.
On the other hand, the need for flexibility by administrators is obvious
where so little hard data exists." What is needed, and what the Code
attempts to provide, is a set of objective control factors that will protect
inmates from the personal arbitrariness of individual administrators and
from the general degrading conditions that have nothing to do with the
4. For example, Illinois law prior to the Code of Corrections defined felons
in terms of penitentiary incarceration. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 2-7 (1971); and pro-
vided for probation as an exception to the "penalty provided for" in the statute defining
it. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 117-1(a)(3) (1971).
5. Imprisonment indicates incarceration in the Department of Corrections, usually
reserved for felony convictions only, and not incarceration in county or other local
penal institutions. See IUCC § 1005-8-6. The term also excludes those sections of
the Code dealing with the confinement of adjudicated juveniles committed to the Juve-
nile Division of the Department. See IUCC §§ 1003-9 to 1003-10.
6. Chapter Three is devoted to the Department of Corrections and the Parole
and Pardon Board. It contains fifteen articles detailing the structures, powers, admin-
istration, facilities, and programs of these two agencies.
7. IUCC § 1003-2-2(a).
8. Juveniles are excluded from the discussions. See supra n.5.
9. See IUCC (West Pub. Co., 1972). Citations to these statutes are contained in
the commentary following each section of the Code.
10. Cohen, The Legal Challenge to Corrections (1969).
11. The most rudimentary research still remains to be done in the area of an
effective prison system; cf. Glaser, The Effectiveness of a Prison and Parole System,
(abr. ed. 1969).
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orderly operation of a secured institution. At the same time, the
Code does not propose such a strict set of guidelines as to eliminate
creative programing and reasonable responses to requirements of order
and discipline by administrators.
A. Five General Control Principles
The Code introduces five general principles which are applicable
to the imprisonment process and which tend to limit the range of dis-
cretion administrators can exercise over committed persons. The
primary control factor imposed by the Code is on the initial use of
imprisonment at all. Since the possibilities remain strong, under any
system, that imprisonment will result in many arbitrary denials of free-
dom without compensating gains in achieving rational penal goals, the
Code creates certain presumptions against the use of imprisonment.
While it cannot be said that the Code makes incarceration the last
sanction an alternative, it remains clear that it gives preference to
probation and conditional release where these alternatives are avail-
able.1" For one thing, it requires the sentencing judge to consider a
pre-sentence report in all felony convictions prior to imposition of
sentence. 13  For another, it places conditions on the imposition of a
sentence of imprisonment which requires the judge to determine from
the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the condition of the
offender, that imprisonment is called for.' 4  Finally, prior to any use
of the extended term of imprisonment,' 5 the court must have the de-
fendant thoroughly examined by a diagnostic clinic' 6 and base any
12. Probation is disallowed for murder, rape, armed robbery, and certain drug
offenses. IUCC § 1005-5-3(d)(1).
13. "A defendant shall not be sentenced before a written presentence report of
investigation is presented to and considered by the court where the defendant is con-
victed of a felony." IUCC § 1005-3-1.
14. "The court shall impose a sentence of imprisonment upon an offender if,
having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense, and to the history, char-
acter and condition of the offender, the court is of the opinion that:
(1) his imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the public; or
(2) the offense is in need of correctional treatment that can most effectively be
provided by a sentence to imprisonment; or
(3) probation on conditional discharge would deprecate the seriousness of the
offender's conduct and would be inconsistent with the ends of justice."
11UCC § 1005-6-1(a).
15. IUCC § 1005-8-2 provides for a term of imprisonment up to twice the maxi-
mum for a felony where the defendant inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily
harm or used a firearm in the commission of a felony, and presents a "continuing risk
of physical harm" to the public, and where the court finds that is necessary for the
protection of the public.
16. IUCC § 100-5-3-3 provides for a period of commitment for examination up to
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sentence choice on such report. 17  While these guidelines would not
eliminate the use of imprisonment altogether in most felony convictions,
their presence in the Code, together with the provisions for a pre-sen-
tence hearing at which these matters are open to challenge,' 8 should
assure defendants of improved protection from arbitrary and automatic
imposition of imprisonment.'
A second control factor involves the Code's specification of goals
for corrections. While the Code does not attempt to deal in an exten-
sive way with the very difficult problem of goals,2" it does set out some
general norms which should govern the use of imprisonment: a) pro-
tection of the public;2' b) restoration of offenders to useful citizenship; 22
and c) avoidance of arbitrary and oppressive treatment of imprisoned
persons. 23  Punishment as a goal of imprisonment is not mentioned,
though the clear implication of language in the Code indicates that the
punitive goal is present. 24  Rehabilitation is mentioned as a goal ot
corrections, 25 as is treatment, 2 but these terms would have to be read
within the larger goal of restoration to useful citizenship. Clearly, the
Code does not propose a "medical model" for correctional treatment,2 7
though it does recognize the need for medical and mental health services
60 days in a diagnostic clinic, either in the Department of Corrections or in a court
provided clinic.
17. IUCC § 1005-8-2(b).
18. IUCC § 1005-4-1.
19. Appellate review of sentences is a matter not dealt with by the Code, but it
seems obvious that the provisions set out in the foregoing paragraphs will provide the
appellate courts even broader scope for their present jurisdiction; cf. A.B.A., Minimum
Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences (1968).
20. For an examination of the problem, see Gerber and McAnany, The Philosophy
of Punishment; Johnson, Savitz and Wolfgang, The Sociology of Punishment and
Corrections at 337-361 (2d Ed. 1970).
21. IUCC § 1001-1-2(b).
22. IUCC § 1001-1-2(d). This language is borrowed from the Ill. Const. art. I,
§ 11 (1970).
23. IUCC § 1001-1-2(c).
24. For instance, the requirement that sanctions be proportionate to the seriousness
of the offense, IUCC § 1001-1-2(a), and that sentences reflect the seriousness of the
offense, IUCC §§ 1005-6-1(a)(3) and 1003-35(c)(2), indicates punitive purposes. Be-
sides, any fair reading of Chapter V on sentencing forces one to conclude that rehabili-
tation and social defense do not account for the imposition of sanctions. Whether
retribution is a legitimate punitive goal, or only a deterrent, is not resolved. For a
general discussion of such issues, see Gerber and McAnany, Contemporary Punish-
ment (1972).
25. E.g., IUCC § 1003-2-2(a), (b), and (d). The term "rehabilitation" is not
defined in the Code.
26. E.g., IUCC § 1003-2-2(a), 1003-6-1(b). The term "treatment" is not defined
in the Code.
27. The "medical model" approach to corrections has been thoroughly discussed
in Kittrie, The Right to be Different (1971). For a review of recent litigation chal-
lenging the medical approach, see Prettyman, The Indeterminate Sentence and the Right
to Treatment, 11 Amer. Crim. L. Rev. 7 (1972).
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for those who require them.2" In reading all of this language together,
the correctional administrator is given guidance in implementing pro-
grams and the inmate is protected from arbitrary overreach into areas
of privacy lying outside these stated goals. Any action taken by the
Department of Corrections in dealing with committed persons must be
able to answer the question of "Why?" in terms of the Code language.
A third control factor is the establishment of certain minimum
standards for the physical and social treatment of committed persons.2 9
These standards set out requirements for sanitation and safety, 0 and
food,31 clothing, 2 recreation, 3 mail, 4 visits,85 religious ministrations, 3
and protection of persons and property. 7  While these standards are
necessarily general in tone, there are certain specifications detailed in
the Code, s and there is a general mandate to the Department to provide
rules and regulations for the implementation of these standards. 9 These
minimum standards by their wording impose a duty on the Department
to provide resources to meet them. They provide a readily identifiable
norm for determining whether or not the Department is meeting its
obligations.
28. The Code provides for certain medical care see IUCC § 1003-6-2(e) and
1003-8-2(a), as well as mental health treatment, see IUCC § 1003-82(a), 1003-84(b)
and 1003-8-5 to 8-6. The Code does not preserve a statutory provision for a separate
psychiatric division within the Illinois Penitentiary System. See, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 108,
§ 106 (1971). The Code allows the Department to create and designate institutions
and programs according to needs of the population. See, IUCC § 1003-6-1, which
would include medical care centers. See also, Zalman, Prisoners' Rights to Medical Care,
63 J. Crim. L. 185 (1972).
29. IUCC § 1003-7. The United Nations' Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners and Selection of Personnel (1957) and the International Com-
mission of Jurists' Standard Minimum Rules (1970) are the only developed attempts to
create a comprehensive bill of rights for prisoners.
30. IUCC § 1003-7-3.
31. IUCC § 1003-7-2(c).
32. Id.
33. IUCC § 1003-7-2(a), (b).
34. IUCC § 1003-2(d). Whether the type of censorship allowed under this sec-
tion conforms to constitutional standards being forged by the courts remains to be
seen. See, e.g., Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971).
35. IUCC § 1003-7-2(e).
36. IUCC § 1003-7-2(f).
37. IUCC § 1003-7-4. For a recent and strong statement of the obligation to
protect inmates from guards and other inmates, see Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825
(E.D. Ark. 1969), afj'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
38. For example, the Department must provide postage for at least three first
class letters each week, IUCC § 1003-7-2(a); allow individuals to leave their cells for
at least one hour each day, IUCC § 1003-7-2(b); take a bath at least once a week,
and have access to TV and radio, IUCC § 10037-2(a); and provide at least 50 square
feet of floor space for each person in any newly created or remodeled cell, IUCC
§ 1003-7-4. The words "at least" indicate the minimal nature of these standards.
39. IUCC § 10037-7-1.
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A fourth control factor is the requirement of the Department to
produce rules and regulations for the administration of its programs.
The Code, like other legislation dealing with governmental agencies,
allows the Department to create rules and regulations for the purpose
of carrying out its legislative mission. 40  But it goes on to require the
Department to promulgate rules intended to specify general legislative
norms. 41  This requirement had its first public expression with the
publication of a set of administrative regulations for the Adult Division,
in February and December 1972, based on the proposed Code of
Corrections. 42  These regulations serve as a secondary basis for limiting
discretion exercised by Department officials over inmates and provide a
detailed set of norms against which action affecting inmates can be
judged.48
A final control factor affecting administrative discretion is the
requirement of informational input on certain key program decisions,
together with a recording of reasons for the decision. Clearly one of the
most fundamental complaints voiced by inmates has been that decisions
are made without any appropriate input of information, and/or without
any record or information of how the decisions were made. In a word,
administrators, from wardens down to guards, could make a decision on
their subjective judgment without being bound to hear other informa-
tional sources, and these decisions were not recorded, or recorded in
such general terms as to be unreviewable at a later date.4" The Code
goes a long way toward requiring accountability for correctional
decisions by specifications of certain informational input before deci-
sions can be made.45 It also requires a timely recording of decisions,
plus the informational basis upon which they rest4 and in some in-
40. IUCC § 1003-2-2(m).
41. E.g., IUCC § 1003-7-1 (general requirements); § 1003-8-3(b) (program as-
signment procedures); § 1003-7-4 (protection of persons and property); § 1003-8-7(d);
§ 1003-8-8(a) (grievance procedures).
42. Illinois Department of Corrections, Administrative Regulations, Adult Division
(Feb. and Dec. 1972) (hereinafter referred to as Ad. Regs.).
43. One of the issues which such detailed regulations will complicate is the re-
quirement of the exhaustion of state remedies for federal jurisdiction; cf. Edwards v.
Schmidt, 321 F. Supp. 68 (W.D. Wis. 1971); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1971); Wilwording v. Swanson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
44. The lack of accountability is a constant theme in prison litigation cases. See,
e.g., Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
45. Sentencing in general, IUCC § 1005-3-1; sentences of imprisonment, IUCC
§ 1005-6-1(a); extended term of imprisonment, IUCC § 1005-8-2(b); parole, IUCC
§ 1003-3-4(d); social evaluation and assignment to an institution, IUCC § 1003-8-2(a);
program assignment, IUCC § 1003-8-3(a); institutional transfer, IUCC § 1003-8-4(b);
transfer to Department of Mental Health, IUCC § 1003-8-5(a); disciplinary procedure,
IUCC § 1003-8-7(c).
46. Sentencing, IUCC § 1005-4-1(d)(2); parole, IUCC § 1003-3-5(f); transfer,
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stances communication of the decision and the reasons for it to the
person affected.4 7
II. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR
CORRECTIONAL DECISIONS
Beside the above-mentioned general control factors placed on all
administrative decision-making concerning inmates, the Code selects
six decisions as particularly important and sensitive and requires
certain specific procedural safeguards to be afforded. These six areas
are: granting and revocation of parole; reception and evaluation;
program assignment; transfer; imposition of discipline; and hearing of
grievances.48 To anyone familiar with prison problems, these areas
represent the heart of most inmate grievance lists.49
A. Parole
The initial parole decision, under the Code, is surrounded with
procedural safeguards which, while in no way detracting from the
discretionary nature of the decision, 50 protect an eligible prisoner from
arbitrariness. They are as follows: the Board must consider a person
30 days prior to his eligibility date;5' before making its decision it must
consider certain informational input, including material submitted by
the eligible person;52 it must hold an interview with the eligible person
before a Board member;"3 it must make its determination in panels of at
IUCC § 1003-8-4(a); imposition of major discipline, IUCC § 1003-8-7(e)(5). All
major decisions are to be included in each inmate's master record file, IUCC § 1003-5-1
(a).
47. Parole, IUCC § 1003-3-5(f); discipline, IUCC § 1003-8-7(e)(5). An inmate
must be advised of the factual basis of any decision of the Department which affects
the length of his confinement, IUCC § 1003-5-1(b). The meaning of this section
awaits the interpretation of the courts. Clearly it is a major breakthrough for protec-
tion against the use of inaccurate information that heretofore remained anonymous to
the person affected.
48. The American Correctional Association in its Manual of Correctional Stand-
ards (1966) deals with most of these problems: parole, at 113-34; reception and
evaluation, at 351-65; program assignment, discipline, at 401-21; cf. the list of griev-
ances set out in Morris v. Travisono, supra n.44, at 860-61.
49. In an average month in California adult institutions, prisoner complaints con-
stituted the following order of frequency; (1) parole; (2) transfer and classification;
(3) legal; (4) medical; (5) program treatment; (6) religion and race; (7) property;
(8) mail and visits; (9) protection. Note, The Penal Ombudsman; A Step Towiard
Penal Reform, 3 Pacific L.J. 166, 168-71 (1972).
50. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
51. IUCC § 1003-3-4(a).
52. IUCC § 1003-3-4(d).
53. IUCC § 1003-3-5(b).
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least three Board members; 54 its decision must be based on standards
set out in the Code;55 it must render it within a reasonable time,56 and
communicate to the person in writing, the basis for the decision.57
The Board must set a rehearing no later than one year, 58 and follow
up on a positive decision to release by review if the paroled person is
not released within ninety days.59 No provision is made in the Code
for representation by counsel at the hearing, though, of course, counsel
may be retained to prepare any written statement that the eligible person
wishes to submit. 60
Revocation is the other significant decision in the parole process.
In light of the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Morrisey v. Brewer,6'
the provisions of the Code for a hearing are clearly inadequate. 2 The
Code provides for a hearing before at least one member of the Board
acting for a panel of three. 63  The Code provides for a record of the
hearing," and allows the alleged violator to appear, answer and bring
witnesses in his behalf. 65 While these provisions may have appeared
generous in comparison with the practice of other boards, Morrisey
renders them far too niggardly in due process content. The Supreme
Court now requires an on-site hearing for probable cause before a
neutral party (not the parole officer recommending revocation); to-
gether with notice of the alleged violations; presence of the parolee;
54. 11UCC § 1003-3-5(a).
55. "The Board shall not parole a person eligible for parole if it determines that:
(1) there is a substantial risk that he will not conform to reasonable conditions
of parole; or(2) his release at that time would deprecate the seriousness of his offense or
promote disrespect for the law; or(3) his release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional dis-
cipline."
IUCC § 1003-3-5(c). The origin of the wording of this section is the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code, § 305.9(1) (P.O.D. 1962), with certain changes.
It appears the Board is mandated to either make a positive finding under one of these
standards or grant the eligible person parole.
56. IUCC § 1003-3-5(f).
57. Id. Monks v. New Jersey State Board of Parole, 58 N.J. 238, A.2d 193
(1971). What the Board will include in its statement of the "basis" is not yet deter-
mined. Rules for the operation of the Board under the Code have not yet been
issued. Clearly a denial of parole would entitle a person to a statement that includes
any "factual information" on which it relied. IUCC § 1003-5-1(b).
58. IUCC § 1003-3-5(f).
59. Id.
60. Parole Board Rules have allowed counsel to make a presentation to the
Board, both by written document and by personal appearance, at eligibility hearings.
61. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
62. IUCC § 1003-3-9(d). Legislation amending this section to conform it to
the basic requirements of Morrisey v. Brewer was approved Dec. 27, 1972, Public Act
2827.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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the right to answer and present other evidence; and a limited right
to confront adverse witnesses.6" The initial hearing must be sum-
marized and the determination must be based on the evidence before
the hearing officer, together with reasons for the determination and the
evidence relied on. 7 The formal revocation hearing before the Board
must have the basic due process protection given any right, conditional
or absolute, whose violation would constitute a "grievous loss. ''68 A
summary of these procedural safeguards include: notice, discovery,
opportunity to be heard in person and present other evidence, including
witnesses, confrontation and cross-examination; a neutral hearing body
and a written statement of reasons and evidence relied on if the decision
is negative.6 9
B. Reception and Evaluation
When a prisoner is received by the Department of Corrections the
Code requires that the individual's identity be verified before he can be
received, 7° and that all pertinent reports and papers forwarded by the
court be presented with the prisoner. 7' Prior to permanent institutional
assignment the Department is required to make a thorough social eval-
uation of each individual. On the basis of this evaluation an institution
is chosen which best fits the individual's program needs. 72  A complete
program assignment is recommended, including custodial status, by
the staff of the Reception and Diagnostic Center and these recommend-
ations are forwarded to the receiving institution.73  A record of the
66. Morrisey v. Brewer, at 485-87.
67. Id. at 487.
68. The Court disposed of the right-privilege distinction as applied to parole by
citing its decisions in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), and Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
69. Morrisey v. Brewer, at 489.
70. IUCC § 1003-8-1(b).
71. This includes the sentence imposed, any statement by the court of the basis
for imposing the sentence, credited time, presentence report and statements by the
State's Attorney and defense counsel. IUCC § 1005-4-1(d). This requirement is in-
tended to make available immediately on arrival of the prisoner any court-generated
materials pertinent to his correctional treatment. Under former law, when presentence
reports were prepared for the courts, no requirement or practice made them available
to the Department of Corrections.
72. IUCC § 1003-8-2. The language of the section allows for flexibility: "in
so far as practicable". Id. § 1003-8-2(a). The Code does not provide for specific
institutions within the Department as former law did. Cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 108, § 105
(1971). Instead it allows the Department to determine the number, kinds, functions,
etc., of institutions according to the needs of "committed persons for treatment and
the public for protection". IUCC § 1003-6-1(b). See Ad. Regs. § 801.
73. Ad. Regs. § 801(5). For a critical case dealing with the whole problem of
classification and its uses and misuses, see Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857
(D.R1I. 1970). See also, Note, Prisoner Classification and Administrative Decision
Making, 50 Tex. L. Rev. 1229 (1972).
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report and recommendation are to be included in the individual's
master record file."4 While the receiving institution of permanent
assignment has the final authority to make program assignments and
to determine custodial status for the individual, the Social Evaluation
Report must be considered in so doing. The significance of this initial
evaluation continues throughout the individual's entire prison term.
Unfortunately, there is no provision in the Code or Administrative
Regulations which allows an individual to see his Social Evaluation
Report and, as a practical matter, he must depend on his counselor to
interpret for him what the Reception and Diagnostic staff has said of
him.
C. Program Assignment
Once an individual has been assigned to an institution, he must
be given a permanent program assignment within sixty days.75 This
is done by an Assignment Committee or Program Team composed of
three staff members, one of whom must be a Program Services staff
member.78  The inmate must be given the opportunity to appear be-
fore the Committee and address it when his case is under considera-
tion.77 But once permanent assignment has been made, there is provi-
sion for a change of a non-training assignment by the Assignment
Captain without consulting the Committee, based on the recommenda-
tion of the inmate's supervisor "for cause." A hearing for such changes
may be requested through the inmate's counselor.7s  All decisions,
whether by Committee or by the Assignment Captain, must be preceded
by an interview of the inmate and a review of the inmate's master
record file.79  All decisions must be in writing and the basis for the
decision stated in the body of the decision for review by the Chief
Administrative Office or his designee.8 0
The central importance of the Assignment Committee is not hard
74. IUCC § 1003-8-2(b).
75. Ad. Regs. § 802.
76. Id. Program Services is a term designating non-custodial staff members as-
signed to classification and all treatment programs. Cf. Ad. Regs. § 1000.
77. Ad. Regs. § 802.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. There is no provision for communication of this information to the
inmate. Since these decisions as to assignments often reflect a judgment by the institu-
tion as to the progress of the inmate and could affect his ultimate release on parole,
an appropriate policy of informing him should be developed in the Administrative Regu-
lations. It is doubtful whether an inmate could utilize the Code provision for access
to information in his records in the case of program assignments since its effect on
the length of his incarceration is indirect at best. IUCC § 1003-5-1(b).
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to fathom. It makes program and security determinations which have
direct and indirect bearing on how an inmate will serve his time. The
power of the Committee is great, particularly in the area of security
classifications, on which depend eligibility for furloughs and work re-
lease, and ability to earn good time."' The development and communi-
cation of more fully detailed procedures in this area should include dis-
closure to the inmate, of the basis for any decision affecting him, to-
gether with more fully developed channels of review.
D. Transfers
Once permanent assignment has been made to an institution, any
transfer to other institutions can seriously affect the individual's chance
to continue in a program, to enjoy certain privileges, and in the end
to be given parole. The decision to transfer an inmate thus is a
correctional decision that is in need of careful procedural control.8 2
The scope of the transfer power in the Department of Corrections
is considerable. Under Section 1003-4-4 (Interstate Corrections Com-
pact) of the Code, the Department has the power to transfer inmates
outside of the State "in order to provide adequate quarters and care or
an appropriate program of rehabilitation or treatment. 8s3  A general
grant of power to "transfer (committed persons) to other appropriate
agencies,"" 4 is given. Within this general power, the Department is
given power to transfer certain adults 5 to the Department of Mental
Health for up to six months or longer.86 A committed person may be
transfered to other institutions or facilities of the Department,87 or to its
special psychiatric facilities after appropriate psychiatric examination. 8
There is a provision also for transfer from the Juvenile Division to the
Adult where a committed juvenile, tried and convicted as an adult,
reaches the age of seventeen.8 9 The Code abolishes the distinction
81. Ad. Regs. § 817(IV)(B) (home visit furloughs); Id., § 1200(3) (work re-
lease); Id. § 815(1) (conditional release).
82. For some recent cases, see, e.g., Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878
(D. Mass. 1971); Buddy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971); Landman v.
Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161
(D.N.J. 1971).
83. IUCC § 1003-4-4(iv)((a).
84. Id. § 1003-2-2(b).
85. Juvenile Division enjoys considerably more power to transfer persons com-
mitted to it to other agencies. See, e.g., IUCC § 1003-10-2(4).
86. Id. § 1003-8-5 and 6.
87. Id. § 1003-8-4(a).
88. Id. § 1003-8-4(b).
89. ld. § 1003-10-7. When such a sentenced juvenile is not paroled by his
twenty-first birthday, his transfer to the Adult Division is automatic. Id. § 1003-10-7
(b).
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between institutions for misdemeanants committed to the Department;
consequently such persons are subject to transfer under general Code
provisions.90
The aforementioned wide ranging power is circumscribed by a
Code provision which places the power of transfer directly under the
Director. "After the initial assignments . . . . , all transfers of com-
mitted persons to another institution or facility shall be reviewed and
approved by a person or persons designated by the Director." 91  The
Administrative Regulations designate the Office of Program Services
for this reviewing and approving role.92 This assignment of authority
outside of the individual institutions will help generate policies with-
drawn from the foibles of individual administrators and the needs of
particular institutions. The process of transfer can be initiated by
either the inmate himself or by staff and must pass first before the
Assignment Committee and then on to the Chief Administrative Officer,
both of whom must recommend it before its going forward to the
Reception and Diagnostic Staff, within the Office of Program Services,
for final approval or disapproval. 3  In this process a report must be
prepared by the Assignment Committee in which the reasons for such
transfer are to be set out,94 and this report must be included in the
inmate's master record file.9" There is no provision for a hearing on
such matters, either in the Code or in the Regulations, but it is suggested
that an opportunity to be heard and to understand the reasons proposed
for transfer should be part of any procedurally sound system.96
Special provisions for transfer to psychiatric facilities within the
Department97 or to the Department of Mental Health9" indicate recog-
nition of the equal protection principles advanced in Baxtrom v.
Herold,99 in that an inmate may not be treated differently from other
citizens in regard to his mental health problems. Where the Depart-
ment wishes to transfer the inmate to its own psychiatric facilities, it
must certify to the Director that such transfer is necessary based on a
90. Cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 118, § 15 (1971), where under former law inmates at
the State Farm (misdemeanants) could be transferred to a prison for felons at the
discretion of the Department.
91. IUCC § 1003-8-4(a).
92. Ad. Regs. § 1000(1).
93. Ad. Regs. § 819.
94. Id., § 819(3) and IUCC § 1003-8-4(a).
95. IUCC § 1003-8-4(a).
96. Shone v. Maine, 406 F.2d 844 (lst Cir. 1969), and cases cited supra n.82.
97. IUCC § 1003-8-4(b).
98. IUCC § 1003-8-5 and 6.
99. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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psychiatric examination, and once transferred his case must be reviewed
at least every six months. 100 Where the transfer is to the Department
of Mental Health, any transfer for six months or less must be consented
to by the inmate, in writing, with opportunities to object by the spouse,
guardian, nearest relative or attorney of record. 1° 1 Where objection
is made by one of these, or where the transfer is for more than six
months, ordinary court proceedings for involuntary committment to the
Department of Mental Health are required.' 02 The inherent protection
provided by court committment proceedings should prevent any misuse
of this transfer power, even where the self-interest of the Department
of Mental Health fails to resist abuses.' 0 '
E. Discipline
"Discipline" is defined by the Code as "the rules and regulations
for the maintenance of order and the protection of persons and property
within the institutions and facilities of the Department and their enforce-
ment."' 0 4  The problem of order maintenance in the prison setting can
be singled out as the major occupation-pre-occupation some would
say--of the corrections profession.' 05 Clearly it must serve as a sub-
stratum to any intelligent program of rehabilitation. But its very
importance can be used to minimize the way in which it is achieved, to
the detriment of all else. When discipline, though superficially effective
is unfair or inhuman, like the criminal law itself, it tends to sacrifice
the very ends it seeks to achieve.' 0 6  These facts have generated issues
almost constantly before the courts in the past ten years and have
100. IUCC § 1003-84(b).
101. ld. § 1003-8-5(a) and (b).
102. Id. § 1003-8-5(c) and (d).
103. For consent to transfers of less than six months, the consent of the Depart-
ment of Mental Health is required. While they thus have power to block such trans-
fers on the basis of inadequate security, lack of appropriate programs and the like,
they have not done so frequently. An interesting parallel might be drawn from the
series of Mental Health transfers which the Department of Children and Family Services
has been accused of making for purposes of "dumping" its problem cases. They are
reported in a study prepared for Judge Joseph Schneider of the Cook County Circuit
Court by Attorney Patrick Murphy of Chicago Legal Aid Office. Chicago Daily News,
Dec. 20, 1972, p. 1 col. 5.
104. IUCC § 1003-1-2(h).
105. A survey conducted by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice in 1967 indicated the following ratios of personnel to inmates among
state adult correctional institutions: custodial 1:4.5; professional 1:119.0; educational
1:88.4. Pres. Com. Task Force, Report on Corrections, Tab. 3, p. 180 (1967).
106. In the end the Justice System becomes the "enemy" and the person who resists
it the moral hero. See George Jackson's eloquent letters from prison. Soledad Bro-
thers: The Prison Letters of George Jackson (1970).
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resulted in a series of decisions relating to prison disciplinary procedures
which the Code is intended to reflect. 107
In the first place, the Code makes some traditional general pro-
visions for order-maintenance in prisons. Among these provisions are
the creation of all custodial employees as conservators of the peace, with
the power of peace officers both on and off premises relating to prisoner
custody. 08 Use of deadly force to prevent riot, mutiny and similar
unusual disturbances is granted, but limited to situations in which the
user reasonably believes it to be necessary. 1 9 Escape, holding of hos-
tages, and destruction of property are punished as Class 2 Felonies.110
The Code also provides the Chief Administrative Officer with certain
emergency transfer powers by which he can evacuate an institution or
facility without the formality of the regular transfer procedures, but he
must provide for a review of the decision as soon as practicable."' The
Administrative Regulations provide for institutional lockups in which
all, most, or some of the inmates may be confined to their cells for an
indeterminant length of time. 1 2 In order to exercise this extraordinary
power, the administrator must be confronted by a "clear and immediate
threat to the security of the institution or to the safety of its employees
or inmates," and before acting must consult with the Director or Assis-
tant Director." 8I
For ordinary discipline cases, the Code makes provision for a two-
fold procedure depending on the gravity of the sanction imposed.
Where the sanction "may involve the imposition of disciplinary isola-
tion; the loss of good time credit . . . or eligibility to earn good time;
a change in work, education, or other program assignment of more
than 7 days duration,""' 4 the Code requires a full hearing with certain
minimum due process requisites discussed below. For the imposition
107. No single source is available which is comprehensive and up to date, but
reference should be made to Singer, Prisoners' Legal Rights: A Bibliography of Cases
and Articles 38-46, 58-59 (1971).
108. IUCC § 1003-2-2(h).
109. Id. § 1003-6-4(b). This section provides uniformity for the use of force in
all escapes, riots, destruction of property and like acts of serious import. Cf. former
Illinois law on these matters: Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, § 2807; Id. ch. 108, §§ 38, 119, 121;
Id. ch. 118, § 18. It also narrows the standard for the use of deadly force to conform
to the standard established in the Criminal Code of 1961 of general application. See
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 7-8 (1971).
110. IUCC § 1003-6-4(a).
111. IUCC § 1003-6-2(c). Cf. Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J.
1971).
112. Ad. Regs. § 809.
113. id.
114. IUCC § 1003-8-7(d).
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of lesser sanctions, the Code allows other hearing procedures which
have been approved by the Director." 5  The Administrative Regula-
tions spell out these less formal procedures. In the first instance, an
infraction may be so minor that verbal correction or counseling is suf-
ficient." 6  If the incident is considered important enough to write up
an Inmate Violation Report, this report is then sent, on the same day,
to the Disciplinary Captain who further determines which reports should
be handled directly by him in an informal way and which forwarded to
the Disciplinary Committee for formal hearing."' Where he handles
the infraction himself, he must interview the inmate(s) involved and
may impose any sanction less than the major sanctions of isolation,
good time loss and major change of program."18
For serious rule violations, the Code sets out the following proce-
dural requirements; an impartial hearing body; notice of charges;
personal appearance before the body with the right to address; a right
in the hearing body to call other witnesses; the conditional right of the
accused to cross-examine such witnesses; a written statement of any
guilty finding, which includes the basis for the decision and the sanction
to be imposed, given to the accused and also placed in his file; review
of the decision, either through the grievance procedure or automatic
review by the Assignment Committee where the sanction is change of
program." 9 While these procedures do not represent the full minimum
due process required by some courts for prison discipline, 2 ' they do
make Illinois one of the first states to respond, legislatively, to the
growing demands for constitutional protection of prisoners' rights.' 2 '
Some of the omissions in the Code are significant, including the
following five areas, which may open the Code provisions to attack.
First, the right of the accused to be present and address the hearing
body leaves unexpressed the fuller right to present evidence, including
115. Ad. Regs. § 804(2).
116. Id. § 804(5) and (6).
117. Id. § 804(6).
118. IUCC § 1003-8-7(e).
119. See cases and their holdings for due process requirement listed in Smoot,
Introductory Outline to Selected Prisoner Federal Civil Rights Problems, to be found
in Practicing Law Institute, II Prisoners' Rights 361-70 (1972).
120. The ordinary course of events has been the initiation of litigation over dis-
ciplinary matters followed by a hasty publication of rules conforming to due process
standards, either while the case is pending or after an equitable decree commanding it.
For the former, see, e.g., Bundy v. Canon, 328 F. Supp. 165, 174 (D. Md. 1971); for
the latter, see, e.g., Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
121. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Cluchette v. Procu-
nier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 783 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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other witnesses, in his behalf. 122  This right, ordinarily accorded any
person in a due process hearing, becomes even more critical where, the
accused inmate is charged with a rule violation which also constitutes an
indictable offense under state law. Therefore, the accused, limited to
his own version of the events, is placed in a Miranda dilemma. The
testimony given after the appropriate warnings, would be available in
any later prosecution. 23  The Administrative Regulations add nothing
to the Code in this regard. One solution, despite the practical problems
it would create for orderly administration, would be to create this fuller
right by amending the Regulations. Included would be the right to
present other evidence with witnesses and, at a minimum, make this a
right where outside prosecution is possible.' 24
Second, the right to cross-examine any witnesses called by the
hearing body should be guaranteed. While the Code makes this right
conditional on the consent of the hearing body, 2 5 the Administrative
Regulations go on to indicate that this right is mandatory when witnesses
are called. 26 While this appears to meet any objection to the full
right to cross examination, there are questions remaining of whether the
hearing body need call any witnesses at all, or may omit calling witnesses
even when the accused requests it. Admitting that discretion should
remain in the hearing body as to the limits of relevancy and materiality,
central witnesses like the complaining guard should be made available
and should be subject to cross-examination.' 27
122. Cluchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
123. Cluchette v. Procunier, supra n.121 at 782-83. The court held that counsel
was also required when the loss involved in the sanction was great. Id. at 783. See
Turner and Daniel, Miranda in Prison: The Dilemma of Prison Discipline and Intra-
mural Crime, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 759 (1972).
124. By allowing evidence other than the inmate's own testimony, the administra-
tion would avoid the problem of forcing a Miranda dilemma on him since the inmate
could call other witnesses to rebut evidence presented against him. Of course the ad-
ministration could always take the radical option of not proceeding against an inmate
through internal discipline when he is subject to and prosecuted by local authorities
under criminal law.
125. IUCC § 1003-8-7(e)(4).
126. "The inmate charged also has the right to question any person or persons so
summoned to testify by the Disciplinary Committee." Ad. Regs. § 804(10).
127. The issue of confrontation and cross-examination has been litigated. See, e.g.,
Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp.
621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Cluchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
The serious problems which such a practice would constitute in the eyes of professional
corrections personnel can be read in the reaction to Judge Pettine's decree in Morris v.
Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1971); Harvard Center for Criminal Justice,
Judicial Intervention in Prison Discipline, 63 J. Crim. L. 200, 225-26 (1972). Judges,
too, are not at all sure that the idea is good. Judge Wyzanski put the matter thus:
"Cross-examination of a superintendent, a guard or a fellow prisoner would almost
inevitably go beyond the usual consequences of such probing in a court. It would
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Third, the question of counsel or counsel substitute needs to be
raised. While no court has indicated an absolute right to counsel in
prison discipline cases, there has been a consistent discussion of the
problem of assistance at such hearings. 1 8 Clearly, for some inmates
whose mental capacity or emotional involvement disallows an intelligent
presentation of facts or cross-examination, the presence of a third party
to assist may be indispensable. Such a person may well alleviate the
unnecessary wrangles between a guard witness and the cross-examiner.
In any event, fairness probably dictates the availability of such third
party assistance where facts would otherwise be distorted or lost.12 9
Fourth, some courts require that the determination of guilt be
based only on the evidence before the hearing body and the the evidence
be "substantial" in quantum. 13  Neither the Code nor the Regulations
refer directly to this standard. Clearly fairness and due process would
be violated and internal consistency of the Code would be lost if the
decision could be made on evidence which was not presented at the
hearing giving no opportunity for the accused to refute it. As to the
quantum of evidence, the requirement of a majority decision, the open
hearings, and the written decision with its basis, all suggest a norm of
"substantial" evidence. This should be developed by the practice of
internal review of those decisions where the evidence is slight or in
dispute. However, there is always the possibility that a charge would
be sustained, even after review, without substantial evidence because of
loyalty to custodial personnel.'' This is an area where explicit evi-
tend to place the prisoner on a level with the prison official. Such equality is not
appropriate in the prison. And it is hardly likely that in the prison atmosphere disci-
pline could be effectively maintained after an official has been cross-examined by a
prisoner. There are certain types of authority which do not have as their sole or even
principal constituent, rationality." Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Mass. 1969),
rev'd 430 F.2d 548 (lst Cir. 1970).
128. The court in Landman v. Royster, supra n.127, indicated that in more
serious charges an inmate may have the right to retained counsel, but no right to
appointed counsel. Id. at 654. In Cluchette v. Procunier, supra n.127, the court
held that an inmate must be provided counsel to assist him in making the choice
between silence or making his own defense before a prison disciplinary committee when
the violation of which he is accused is also an indictable offense. Id. at 783.
129. Landman v. Royster, supra n.127, at 654.
130. See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, supra n.127, at 653-54; Cluchette v. Procu-
nier, supra n.127, at 783-84; Nolan v. Scafati, supra n.127, at 3.
131. This loyalty has frequently been noted. Recently a Harvard University
study of prison disciplinary procedures in Rhode Island found: "Board members may
not act impartially because they feel that their duty is to support the staff in all cases.
As one Board member put it, 'The philosophy in the past has been always back up
your officers, whether they are right or wrong.' Such a view is particularly harmful
to the integrity of the disciplinary process, when, as in most contested hearings, the
evidence consists mainly of conflicting testimony by the prisoner and a staff member."
Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra n.127 at 210.
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dentiary norms would alleviate pressure to seek judicial review of
individual decisions. Practice will help determine what is being done
in this regard.
There remains a final problem which may raise considerable
doubts as to the fairness of the total disciplinary process. It regards
the problem of proportional and substantive due process. The Code
requires that rules be published and posted so that inmates may have
advance notice of what is expected of them. 32 These rules are set out
in the Regulations. 13  While there may be some problems of vagueness
as to the meaning of certain rules, the real problem lies in the lack of
any schedule of sanctions attached to individual rules. It is quite clear
from the Regulations that the determination of the seriousness of an
individual violation is subjectively determined by the officials. In
the first instance, it is the reporting guard who must determine whether
to report the inmate or not. Included are both the Disciplinary Captain
and finally the Disciplinary Committee. 3 4  As far as is evident from
the Code and Regulations, it is possible for an inmate to get disciplinary
isolation, to lose good time, or to have his job reassigned for the smallest
infraction of a rule. Of course, the ordinary unwritten norms of the
institution would suggest otherwise, but there is that intangible thing
called "attitude" which may subject an inmate to serious loss for a
minor violation. Clearly, there is need for the Department to create
some relationship between rules and possible sanctions so that advance
notice of the seriousness of certain violations can be communicated
to the inmates. Otherwise, the system as a whole is subject to attack as
substantially unfair. 3 1 This is particularly true under the Code where
more formal due process protection is reserved for infractions entailing
possible grave sanctions.
F. Grievances
If the Attica riot is used as a yardstick, the most significant of all
correctional procedures would be an adequate grievance mechanism.3 6
132. IUCC § 1003-8-7(a).
133. Ad. Regs. § 805.
134. Ad. Regs. § 804(2), (6), and (12).
135. Cluchette v. Procunier, supra n.127, at 781, dealt with this problem and
decided that, until such a schedule was established, all infractions must be accorded
full due process since potentially all could incur serious sanctions. Cf. Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-60 (1968); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857, 861
(R.I. 1970).
136. The Official Report of the New York State Special Commission on Attica,
(1972). The tragedy of Attica lies in the fact that once serious grievance processes
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The stored hostilities arising in normal human intercourse can be signifi-
cant enough, but in the prison setting, the exacerbation of human dif-
ference is raised to a high pitch. Where men are subject to daily
control of the most autocratic sort, there are bound to be festering prob-
lems that have to be aired and dissipated before they become uncon-
trollable.' 37 On the other hand, simply because the nature of the
prison system is inherently coercive, there will always be grievances
which can never be alleviated. What is needed-indeed required-is
a system of access to a source of power which can identify legitimate
grievances and resolve them.
The Code provides that a grievance procedure be established by
the Director of Corrections, 13 8 which contains the following statutory
requirements: notice of the grievance process must be given to all
inmates;' 39 access to it must be unrestricted;140 an impartial reviewing
course must be provided;14' a record of the grievance must be preserved
for one year;' 42 and direct appeal may be made to certain individuals
outside the institution. 4 ' The Administrative Regulations spell out the
details of this system.14 4
Step One, under the present Regulations, is the placing of a
grievance in locked mail boxes accessible to all inmates and directed to
the Chief or Assistant Administrator, Chaplains, or Clinical Services
staff. These grievances are routed to their addressees who must respond
within five working days. 145 If an inmate does not receive satisfaction,
he may initiate Step Two, which is direction of his complaint to
special institutional counselors appointed to handle such cases. They
must respond within ten working days.146  Step Three, for a still dis-
gruntled inmate, is to take his case to the Institutional Inquiry Board
which meets weekly. An inmate must have the opportunity to appear
before the Board and the Board may call other witnesses. A written
were instituted during the riot and lives depended on them, both sides were unable to
communicate successfully. It was too late in a history of stored hostilities.
137. Schwartz, Prisoner's Rights:* Some Hopes and Realities, in American Trial
Lawyers' Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference, A Program for Prison Reform
47 (1972); Mattick, The Prosaic Sources of Prison Violence Occas'l Papers from U.
Chi. L.S. (1972).
138. IUCC § 1003-8-8(a).
139. Id. § 1003-8-8(d).
140. Id. § 1003-8-8(a), (e).
141. Id. § 1003-8-8(a).
142. Id. § 1003-8-8(b).
143. Id. § 1003-8-8(c).
144. Ad. Regs. § 845.
145. Id. § 845(1).
146. Id. § 845(2).
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report must be filed in ten days after receipt with the Chief Ad-
ministrator who must take action within five days.' 4 7  Step Four
involves taking him outside the institution to the Director or Assistant
Director. If these persons find no merit in the complaint, the inmate is
informed by letter. 148  If there seems to be merit to the claim, the
matter is then referred, in Step Five, to an Administrative Review
Board. This Board will hold a hearing on the matter and call any wit-
nesses it wishes, both staff and inmates. Its determination is presented
to the Director who, in consultation with the Assistant Director, will
make a final determination to be communicated to the inmate. 49
This procedure is set out in detail, indicating the seriousness with
which the Department has apparently taken the problem of grievances.
On the other hand, to an outside observer, not to say to the inmate, it
appears needlessly elaborate and complicated and is dominated by the
fact that only one person in this elaborate scheme, an appointed
member of the Administrative Review Board,' is a person from outside
the Department. While this grievance procedure clearly fulfills any
known requirement of due process, it overlooks the value of review of
grievances by an outside party.
There have been suggestions and even implementation of other
sources of review for grievances. It goes without saying that the
courts remain available to resolve complaints of a constitutional or
statutory nature.' 51 Inmates may also have a constitutional right of
access to certain governmental officials outside the Department.152
Further, there is precedent for allowing the inmate to have access to
the press, both by letter and through interviews. 8 3 Probably the most
discussed and seemly acceptable mode of grievance resolution lies in
the use of the Ombudsman system.'1 4  Whether or not such a system
147. Id. § 845(3) to (9).
148. Id. § 845(10), (11).
149. Id. § 845(12) to (16).
150. "The Administrative Review Board will be appointed by the Director and
will be composed of three persons--one person from the Director's staff, one person
from the Assistant Director's staff, and one person not employed by the Department of
Corrections." Ad. Regs. § 845(13).
151. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
152. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 788-89 (D.R.I. 1970).
153. Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, - F. Supp. - (D.C. 1972); Seattle-
Tacoma Newspaper Guild v. Daggett, - F. Supp. - (W.D. Wash. 1972); Burnham v.
Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880 (W.D.N.Y. 1972). Cf. Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545,
547-48 (1st Cir. 1971) (allowing prisoners to send letters to the press concerning prison
matters). See Comment, A Prisoner-Press Interview Right, 11 Amer. Crim. L. Rev.
273 (1972).
154. James R. Reed, "Ombudsman", Pennsylvania Prison Society, Testimony at
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comes to be common in corrections, the need for an outside-and thus
"objective" in the inmates' view-source of review seems imperative, not
only for the satisfaction of inmate complaints against the system, but
also for the protection of the system itself. Clearly the judges would
welcome any system which lessened the flood of prisoner rights cases
that are inundating the courts.1 55
CONCLUSION
Any legislative approach to reform in corrections will always be
subject to the limitations of such a method. The essence of reform
lies in the men who administer the system. Clearly, Illinois has em-
barked on an ambitious program of reform and the Code of Corrections
is integral to its efforts. But legislation will not necessarily preclude
litigation. There are some doubts, as I have indicated, left by the Code
in regard to the use and administration of the sanction of imprisonment.
Not everything which a single court has decided in favor of inmate rights
has been translated into legislative mandate. Rather, the Code is
intended to replace unrestrained, subjective correctional decisions with
the objectives of an "informational due process" in which the facts are
determined by the best evidence, fairly arrived at. Clearly, incarcera-
tion is not the optimum choice for penal sanctioning, but reason dic-
tates that it will continue to be used, even frequently, and the problem
of limits to its impact on the individual must be faced and resolved.
The courts are the ultimate determiners of the parameters of incarcera-
tion, but they will be aided by a Code that creates a systematic set of
guidelines.
Hearings on Prisoners' Representation Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary (Nov. 10, 1971); Md. Code Ann., Art. 41, 204F (1970 Cum. Supp);
Fitzharris, The Desirability of a Correctional Ombudsman, Report to California As-
sembly Interim Committee on Criminal Procedure (1971). Though Maryland appears
to be the only state that has to date adopted a legislative office of prison ombudsman,
there are several prisons within states that are experimenting with it, including Pennsyl-
vania and Minnesota.
155. 1970 Administrative Office of the United States Court, Annual Report of the
Director, reported that prisoners' petitions amounted to 18 percent of the total civil
filings in all federal district courts. It adds ominously that this figure represents an
overall growth of 276 percent since 1963. Id. at 11-44. The issue of exhaustion of
state remedies thus becomes crucial in such federal suits as brought under § 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act. See supra n.43.
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